What is doctrine? §2

When considering a Catholic approach to doctrine it is necessary to distinguish between ‘doctrine’ and ‘dogma’. The latter refers to those doctrines that have been ‘dogmatically defined’, that is by a form of words and explicit decree (for example the Catholic doctrine of the Immaculate conception of Mary, was dogmatically defined by Pope Pius IX in 1854).[1] Other teachings, such as elements of Eucharistic theology, have not been dogmatically defined but still exist as doctrine. In July 1998 Pope John Paul II affirmed in his Motu Proprio Ad Tuendam Fidem, that both all doctrines – those dogmatically defined as well as those not – require a “religious submission of the intellect and will”,[2] because they are teachings of truth. Therefore this requirement of Catholics is reflected in Ecclesiastical Law. [3]

Although there is considerable opposition to the role of tradition in the formulation and understanding of the role of doctrine in the modern world, it seems appropriate that tradition ought to be considered – to a greater or lesser extent – because of the human nature of “teaching and learning” about truth and about God. Although doctrine is thought to expound divine truth it does so for humanity’s sake. Tradition is characteristically anthropological, as noted by an evolutionary biologist:

The quality of man that is lacking in animals is, to be precise, not intellect but tradition – tradition as the possibility of passing on to others the product of the intellect and thus augmenting and enriching it as it is preserved from generation to generation.[4]

Indeed, doctrine is not something that is newly discovered by each successive generation of Christian scholars, but one that is “passed on” from one generation of Christians to the next. The understanding of Christianity that exists in the present day (and which is articulated in doctrine) is the product of many centuries of theological discussion and considerable discernment. The New Testament presents no conceptually advanced Christology[5] and the sixth ecumenical council – held in 680-681 AD – continued to definitively teach new truths about Christ’s nature (specifically, the nature of Christ’s human and divine wills)[6] which remain doctrinal today. It is therefore obvious that the doctrine of the modern Church is the product of lengthy historical consideration (itself tradition) and an automatic denial of the potential validity of the Patristic interpretations is a denial of the presence and action of the Holy Spirit in earlier times.[7] As such, it is necessary to acknowledge that doctrine is the product of considerable study and consideration on the part of the church over many centuries, fundamentally led by the Holy Spirit but nuanced by its sitz-im-leben.

Both the distinctively Catholic definition of Deneffe and the protestant view of Grudem represent doctrine as having been formulated by a holistic and systematic approach: in both Grudem’s affirmation that teaching comes from the “whole of the Bible” and the mutually complementary understanding of Scripture, Tradition and Magisterium as found in Catholic theology. It is clear in both cases that doctrine cannot contradict the revelation found in scripture and is an application or understanding of that revelation. Even holding that there is no further public revelation anticipated – for God has said everything in a Son[8] – this revelation has not been made “completely explicit”[9] and the doctrine of the Church serves to make the truths of revelation known to humanity.

---

[1] Pope Pius IX. (1854) Ineffibilis Deus. Vatican City: Catholic Truth Society. Promulgated and entered into the Acta Apostolica Sedis on December 8^th 1854

[2] Second Vatican Council. (1964) Dogmatic Constitution on the Nature of the Church. [Lumen Gentium]. Vatican City: Catholic Truth Society. §25.

[3] Pontifical Council for Legislative Text. (1983) Codex Iuris Canonici. Vatican City: Catholic Truth Society. §750-752.

[4] Rustow A. (1951) Kulturtradition und Kulturkritik. Studium Generale. 4(1): 308. Translation courtesy of Ratzinger J, McCarthy MF. (1981) Formal principles of Catholicism. San Francisco: Ignatius Press.

[5] Lohse B. (1966) A Short History of Christian Doctrine. Philadephia: Fortress Press. 73.

[6] McNeil JT. (1937) The twenty ecumenical councils of the Catholic Church. Church History. 6(2): 189-190.

[7] Kesich V. (1993) The Orthodox Church and Biblical interpretation. St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly. 37(3): 343-351

[8] Hebrews 1:1-2.

1 Timothy 6:14.

Titus 2:13.

[9] Catholic Church (1997) op cit. §66

 

Back to Stafford…

Today I returned to Stafford town, where I did my pre-nursing training in 2001-2, as a friend of mine who studied Horticulture at university was showing some flowers and it was an opportunity to catch up and fondly remember the trial and tribulations of being a pre-nurse at the now infamous Stafford Hospital. Unlike most of my colleagues, I began my career with a first placement at St George’s psychiatric hospital.

Flowers are not generally my thing, but there was much to look at:

Afterwards myself and some former pre-nurses made a pilgrimage to Stafford’s premier diner:

On the way we passed the College whose corridors we once graced (although, some more frequently absent than others!):

There was generalised scandal to discover that the Whiteley Bulding (which was then our common room/pool room/bar, and basically the only building that I attended with any degree of regularity, to my shame), has been converted into some sort of trendy “arts centre”:

We then paid a visit to the Bird in Hand, where the landlord claimed to remember me:

Afterwards I wandered alone around Victoria Park and its environs:

 

What is doctrine? §1

The word ‘doctrine’ is frequently used by Christians from all walks of life: in both academic and pastoral settings and by those of vastly divergent ecclesial traditions. Academics have long debated the true definition of ‘doctrine’ (and its relation to the similar term ‘dogma’) and the interface between ‘doctrine’ and the daily life of the Christian faithful is often difficult to discern, particularly given the  apathy that Christians feel towards doctrine itself and the scepticism that is felt regarding its theological investigation.[1] Therefore, providing an exposition of the nature and purpose of Christian doctrine is more difficult than would be initially thought.

Attempting to provide a general (and presumably therefore ecumenical) definition of doctrine, Gunton defines it as “…the officially agreed teaching of [an] institution…”.[2] Indeed, the word doctrine itself is derived from the Latin doctrina, meaning ‘teaching’ and is therefore distinguished from the activity “Theology”. Although theology involves the detailed investigation of revelation[3] and the doctrine of the Church (amongst other things), it is a more open-ended process; one that may come to conclusions or propositions contrary to what is considered ‘true’ by the institution. Gunton’s definition therefore points to the ‘institutional’ nature of Christian Doctrine – having not only been officially confirmed by an institution (usually a Church), but generally defined by the Christian community itself in response to its contemporary concerns. For example, the development of  Nicean Christology (teaching that Christ is homoousios with the Father) arose from the Church’s concern to defend the divinity of Christ from the Arian teachings which they regarded as false.[4] This case demonstrates particularly well the ecclesiological dimension of doctrine because not only the subject of the doctrine, but also the language of the doctrine emerged from the Christian community – homoousios is not found in the Biblical corpus, but one created by the Council Fathers to accurately define their understanding of Christ’s nature.[5]

Therefore, it is possible to argue that the doctrines of Christianity are ‘exclusive truth claims’ insofar as they are ‘claims of truth’. D’Costa, who once advocated a threefold typology of inclusivist, exclusivist and pluralist approaches to truth claims has since rejected this approach stating that any claim of truth must necessarily reject a contrary claim, thus all claims of truth are exclusivist.[6] Such an approach to doctrine is useful because it links the notion of ‘teaching’ to the notion of ‘truth’, and thus the notion of God.

Gunton’s definition of doctrine makes no reference to Christianity or to sources of Christian doctrine, and thus may be an inadequate definition for a Christian theologian to work from. Grudem, articulating a distinctively protestant view, defines doctrine as “…what the whole Bible teaches us today about some particular topic”.[7] Clearly for Grudem the Biblical texts, the written word of God,[8] are themselves the authoritative source of doctrine. Grudem’s approach is helpful as he links Christian doctrine to the revelation of God, but is limiting because of his refusal to acknowledge any other source of revelation as a primary basis for the development of doctrine, as he sees the Bible as the only extant form of God’s revelation to mankind.[9] Grudem’s claim that the revelation of God’s Word as a person (namely Jesus Christ) is no longer an appropriate source for doctrine is difficult, because it denies the possibility of Christ’s presence in the life of the Church, particularly in the sacraments and the continuing ministry of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, Grudem’s claim that Jesus is no longer present may itself be contrary to Jesus’ words as recorded in scripture: “I am with you always…”.[10]

Nevertheless, Grudem’s approach indicates the importance of revelation as the source of doctrine, and particularly the centrality of the Biblical texts. In emphasising the Sacred Scriptures, Grudem has failed to recognise the validity of the Sacred Tradition, which the Catholic Church regards as flowering from the same divine source as Sacred Scripture[11] and existing in a mutually complementary relationship:[12] the Tradition is said to ‘transmit’ the Scripture, serving as a vehicle to deliver the Word of God to successive generations of the Church who are called to ‘preserve, expound and preach’ its content.[13] Therefore, a more holistic and distinctively Catholic view of doctrine is to acknowledge that the Church does not “derive certainty about all revealed truths from the holy Scriptures alone”.[14] A more Catholic definition of doctrine is therefore proposed by Deneffe who says “doctrine is a truth which, as far as its objective content is concerned, is revealed by God and defined by the Church, either through a concilliar decree, an ex-cathedra statement of the Pope, or by the mere fact that is is generally taught in the Church.”[15] Deneffe’s definition of doctrine is controversial amongst protestant Christians who reject the infallibility of the Pope and likely reject the existence of a “magisterium” whereby the Church – namely the College of Bishops in communion with the Pope – has, by Apostolic succession, the task of providing an authoritative interpretation of the Word of God.[16]

---

[1] Thielicke H, Marty ME. (1962) A little exercise for young Theologians. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 3-5.

[2] Gunton C. (2003) The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4.

[3] Nichols A. (2008) What Theology is. [Available online: http://www.christendom-awake.org/pages/anichols/theology.htm; Accessed 1^st July 2008; Last Updated 6^th February 2008].

[4] Ayres L. (2004) Nicea and its legacy: An approach to fourth-century Trinitarian theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 196.

[5] Hardy ER. (1954) Christology of the later Fathers. London: Westminster John Knox. 17.

[6] D’Costa G. Theology of Religions. In: Ford D, Muers R. (2005) The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology since 1918. Edinburgh: Blackwell.  626-630.

Torrance AJ. (2008) Beyond Partnership. Network of Theological Enquiry. Available online at: http://www.cwmnote.org/torrance.php; Accessed 1^st July 2008; Last Update unknown.

[7] Grudem W. (1994) Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine. Leicester: IVP. 25.

[8] ibid. 49.

[9] ibid 50-1.

[10] Matthew 28:20.

[11] Catholic Church. (1997) The Catechism of the Catholic Church. Vatican City: Catholic Truth Society. §80.

[12] ibid §84.

[13] Second Vatican Council. (1965) Dogmatic Consitution on Divine Revelation. [Dei Verbum]. Vatican City: Catholic Truth Society. §9.

[14] Catholic Church. op cit. §82.

[15] Deneffe A. (1931) Dogma, Word and Begriff. Scholastik. 6(1): 531.

[16] Catholic Church. op cit. §85.

 

Good News?

Sometimes we can be a bit pessimistic on this Blog. A lot of the Meebo posters recently seem to think we’re all doomed and everything’s hopeless.

So what’s your good news? Let me know! Let’s see what’s going right in people’s lives.

Maybe you’re feeling really happy? Married recently? Children? New Job? Just graduated? Let me know!

 

Excursus into Philosophy: Hume’s Aesthetics §3

The entirety of Hume’s aesthetic theory rests upon the supposition that there is a universal beauty-sensibility, as there is a universal colour-sensibility. This claim is substantiated by two claims – the first that the longevity of those works which have been found to “universally please in all places and at all times” (ST 232-233), which demonstrate a universal standard buried within the prejudices of each era (which have less general influence and are stripped away by time). Secondly, the extreme complexity of the mental operations which are necessary to truly appreciate beauty justifies the empiricist’s claim for a universal standard in the face of contrary empirical evidence – the taste is so easily interfered with that vast divergence from the universal standard be observed. Whilst both these claims seem logical, they do not of themselves demonstrate a universal beauty-sensibility, let alone a standard that could be used to confirm and condemn concrete sentiments.

Furthermore, the location of the standard in the consensus of true judges is potentially problematic. In his opening definition of the standard, Hume describes it as propositional:[1] “rules” utilised to “reconcile the tastes of men” (ST 229), but concludes with the standard being personal: the “true judge” with a sound disposition to correctly make judgement of taste (ST 234) – the standard of taste is no longer a rule, but the consensus of the ideal critics. If the standard is propositional, the rules determine who the ‘true critics’ are; if the standard is personal, the true critics determine what the ‘rules’ are.[2] Hume seems to advocate both positions in his text – on one hand claiming the “rare character” of the “true judge” is “the standard of taste and beauty” (ST 241) and on the other that “bad critics” should acknowledge the “fault lies in himself” when an antecendent rule that ought to be applied to his analysis is drawn to his attention, thus “silencing the bad critic” (ST 236). Clear for Hume, there is no distinction between the antecedent rules and the consensus of the true judges – they both refer to the same universal standard of taste, but this is problematic in practical terms because it provides no independent means of identifying the ‘true critics’ and an antagonist can always appeal to either Hume’s acknowledged exceptions or to defects in the judge to explain their sentiments of approbation or disapprobation.

In conclusion, Hume’s theory is appealing because it reconciles two pillars of common-sense, the location of beauty as sentiment and the Ogilby-Milton phenomenon. His standard of taste, when taken as an idealised judgment of hypothetical ‘true critics’ is a useful means of endorsing the validity of pronouncing about the correctness of aesthetic judgments without challenging the subjectivity of aesthetic taste. Nevertheless, the problems inherent in locating and independently verifying the true judges and thus affirming aesthetic principles limits the usefulness of Hume’s aesthetic theory. Nothwithstanding this, Hume’s emphasis on the delicacy of the taste, combined with the universal and lasting appeal of many great works – and the existence of aesthetic principles deduced from empirical generalisation – supports the logical validity of affirming the existence of a universal standard of taste in the face of contrary empirical data.

---

[1] Saville K. ‘Kant’s Aesthetic Theory’. In: Bird G. Companion to Kant. (Edinburgh: Blackwell, 2006): Online Edition.

[2] Cf: Eagleton T. ‘The Ideology of the Aesthetic’. Rhetoric of Interpretation and Interpretation of Rhetoric. 9.2 (1988): p329.

 

Addiction Quotes – Top 30

Anybody who has been to an AA or NA meeting will have observed a spirituality that is permeated by a deep sense of humour. If you have never been to an AA or NA meeting, you should probably attend an open meeting: you will never laugh as much in your life.

AAs and NAers also have a habit of acquiring quotes and one liners that are both funny and true. I’m sure somebody could get themselves a PhD evaluting the spirituality expressed in these quotes.

Anyway, I’ve collected my top 30:

1. “Pitiful and incomprehensible demoralization” (Description of the Disease, p30).
2. Suit up and Show up, Don’t shoot up and throw up.
3. When one is too many, but a thousand is never enough.
4. Look back, but don’t stare.
5. Drugs gave us wings to fly, but then they took away the sky.
6. Try it for 90 days, and if you want out we’ll gladly refund your misery.
7. Addiction is the disease of dis-ease.
8. Those who laugh, last.
9. Pain is the touchstone of spiritual growth.
10. Get off the cross, we need the wood.
11. Poor me! Poor me! Pour me a drink!
12. Sick and tired of being sick and tired?
13. Treat your mind like a bad neighborhood – don’t go there alone.
14. Reality can be hell when you’re only visiting.
15. If you pray for a Cadillac and God sends a jackass, ride it.
16. No matter where you go….. there you are!
17. Resentment is the cup of poison we pour for somebody else and then drink ourselves.
18. Rule 62: Don’t take yourself so damned seriously.
19. Change is a process, not an event.
20. Stinking thinking leads to drinking.
21. If your gonna pray and hope for potatoes, you’d better grab a hoe.
22. Life is like an onion; you peel it one layer at a time; and sometimes you cry.
23. You will not longer be able to deceive yourself as sincerely as you did before.
24. If you don’t grow, you go.
25. Let go or get dragged.
26. Worrying is like being in a rocking chair, It gives you something to do but does not get you anywhere.
27. Take the cotton wool out of your ears and stick it in your mouth.
28. “The Joy of Living” is the theme of AA’s 12 steps.
29. Expectations are premeditated resentments.

 

Excursus into Philosophy: Hume’s Aesthetics §2

Hume’s theory is supported by his observation that rules of composition (although these are referred to variously as laws observed by critics and by the artists themselves),[1] which are determined not by reasoning a priori, but by a process of empirical generalisation (consistent with Hume’s broader empiricist position).[2] These rules, which Hume terms “general observations”, attest to what has been found “universally pleasing” throughout the centuries in all countries, (ST §9, 233) which are rooted in the “common human sentiments” (ST §10, 240). Those who have produced pleasing work outwith these general observations are said to have done so not because of their deliberate working outside of the laws, but in spite of them.[3] These general rules, passed down from generation to the next, demonstrate a certain universality of taste, as would be expected if there were a universal standard of taste.

Hume himself anticipates objection to his theory on the basis of obvious disagreement between agents concerning taste judgments. Hume explains this disagreement by explaining them in terms of the agent’s weaknesses rather than the weaknesses of the universal standard of taste: the internal organs of sensation are “rarely sufficiently perfect” to allow the general principles of the universal standard of taste their full outworking (ST 264) or produce a sentiment appropriate to these principles.  Internal or external defects, for example, hinder the agent’s ability to form aesthetic judgments – lacking a necessary serene disposition, a pre-supposition or mood, or poor lighting, for example. The subtle beauty found in elements where beauty is mixed in small degree with other elements may not be distinguished by an agent with insufficiently delicate aesthetic taste – just as Sancho’s Kinsmen are mocked for providing differing analyses of wine from the same barrel despite the fact they each identify a taste present in subtle degree – one the leather and one the iron from the iron key with leather thong.

Individuals who are free from hindrances, prejudices and defects are the ‘true judges’, authentic critics, the consensus  of whom makes up the standard of taste against which the subjective sentiment of an agent can be evaluated. In the vast majority of cases, divergence from the standard of taste is caused by hindrances or defects, but Hume does not presuppose unanimity between the ‘true judges’ (accepting merely consensus) and proposes various exceptions (e.g. the differing taste between the young and the old) without compromising his theory.

---

[1] Hooker EN. ‘The Discussion of taste from 1750 to 1770, and the new trends in literary criticism.’ Proceedings of the Modern Language Association. 49.2 (1934): 577-592.

[2] Korsmeyer CW. ‘Hume and the foundations of taste’. Aesthetics and Art Criticism. 35.2 (1976): 201-215.

[3] Zemach E. ‘Aesthetic properties, Aesthetic laws, and Aesthetic principles.’ Aesthetics and Art Criticism. 46.1 (1987): 67-73.

 

Excursus into Philosophy: Hume’s Aesthetics §1

In his influential work Of the Standard of Taste, David Hume argues for the existence of a universal standard of taste, which he defines as:

“a rule by which the various sentiments of men can be reconciled; at least, a definition afforded, confirming one sentiment and condemning another.” (ST 229)

For Hume, beauty arises not in the objects themselves, but in the mind of the perceiver – taste is a matter of sentiment (ST 229-230). An agent’s taste assigns ‘approbation’  (a feeling of particular pleasure) or ‘disapprobation’ to objects of taste. Whilst ideas subjected to theoretical reasoning may be seen as ‘copies’ of the original impressions, the sentiment of approbation is a simple and primary impression of the mind which cannot be constructed from notions but exists as a simple result of the agent’s perception. Taste, as a sentiment which has no reference beyond itself, cannot strictly be dismissed simply as incorrect, for “all sentiment is right” (ST 230).  This first premise of Humean aesthetics is the principle of the “natural equality of the tastes” – that all tastes hold equal value and no one invidual’s taste can be more valid than another’s.[1]

However, Hume notes that whilst under many circumstances deviation between two agent’s tastes are accepted, on other occasions the deviation seems so “ridiculous and aburd” (ST 231) that the principle of the natural equality of tastes is forgotten, and the deviating sentiment condemned. As an example, Hume suggests that to claim equality of beauty between the works of Ogilby and Milton would be as ridiculous as claiming a mountain was as high as a mole-hill, but the same principle can be seen in the comparison of any two greatly disproportionate objects. This second premise of Humean aesthetics is known as the “Ogilby-Milton phenomenon” and seems to be contrary to the first premise, the natural equality of the tastes because it suggests that judgments regarding the beauty can, after all, be right or wrong.

Hume holds both these positions and manages to reconcile them through his argument for a universal standard of taste.  Drawing on a “great resemblence between mental and bodily taste” (ST 260), Hume argues that as the bitterness of a lemon is not a primary characteristic of the lemon but a sentiment as the result of human impression, soapprobation is the sentiment arising from perception of an object of beauty. As the palet can come to ‘incorrect’ judgments about the taste of a lemon (for example during periods of fever, or cravings, or following a fisherman’s friend mint), so the mental sense can come to ‘incorrect’ judgments about an object o beauty (for example by having distorted sense organs, inadequate natural light or drug induced state). In both cases, the validity of the individual sentiment is not undermined by the claim that the conclusion is false.

Furthermore, in justifying his claim that there is a universal standard of taste, Hume depends upon the Lockean view that colour is not an objective characteristic of the perceived object, but a “phantasm of the senses” (as is beauty). Despite this, it is clearly acceptable to talk of the “true” colour of an object due to the universal existence of “colour-sensibility” within humans.[2] Clearly, certain conditions could give rise to incorrect colour-perception – a yellowed perspective on one experience jaundice, for example – but both the validity of the perception and the reality of the external truth of the object’s colour are upheld without conflict. The external standard of colour provides a rule by which the individual sentiments are judged to be correct or inaccurate. Arguably, therefore, if there is a similarly universal “beauty-sensibility” there are clear grounds for arguing the existence of a universal standard of taste without suggesting that beauty is an objective quality.

---

[1] Kalar B. The demands of taste in Kant’s aesthetics. (Leicester: Continuum, 2006): p11.

[2] Lakoff G. ‘Some empirical results about the nature of concepts’. Mind and Language. 4.1-2 (2007): 103-129.

 

Rethinking a Postcolonial Critical view of Exodus – §5 – CONCLUSIONS!

It is hard to dismiss the Exodus Narrative’s emphasis on God’s concern for Israel in their most vulnerable moments, and the reality that the liberation from Egypt was of central importance in Jewish self-understanding from the earliest days. As readers are inevitably presuppositional, it is entirely unsurprising that those who have experienced colonialism and oppression should identify with the people of Israel’s suffering in, and liberation from, Egypt. Combined with a theology that understands Christ’s ministry as grafting all into the elect nation of Israel, this provides a convincing argument for God’s solidarity with those who endure oppression.

Nevertheless, the case for an analogical application of Exodus to the modern world, invoking the readers to extend the Exodus experience to their own situation, is more tenuous. The Exodus narrative is a highly particular the historical account of God’s liberation of Israel from a specific situation, but the broader history of God’s chosen people demonstrates that the Exodus narrative is not necessarily paradigmatic of God’s interaction with the oppressed. Indeed, the conquest narrative provides a shocking conclusion to the Exodus, forcing the reader to confront the ethical implications of forging or reaffirming a national identity against outside identities.

When the Exodus narrative is considered with the Canaanite conquest as its logical fulfilment, the best claim postcolonial and liberation critics can make is for selective analogical applicability of the Exodus narrative to the modern world. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the Canaanite conquest does not challenge the claim that the text continues to be revelatory for victims of colonialism and oppression, but demonstrates the need for a holistic view – interpreting scripture as a complete unit rather than isolating any singular narrative from the broader context of heilsgeschichte.

A consideration of the Exodus narrative from the postcolonial and liberation critical perspective demonstrates the ambiguities of the Biblical text, and the need for discourse between Biblical scholarship, social science and modern culture.  The dialogue between Said (who offers a Canaanite reading) and Walzer (who offers an Israeli, post-colonial perspective) demonstrates the possible value of postcolonial and liberation critical readings of Exodus in addressing the contemporary political issues in the modern world, including the Holy Land.[1]

Postcolonial and liberation critical readings of Sacred Scripture have highlighted the way in which the Bible has been used to oppress populations, particularly in Latin American and South Africa. The fact that postcolonial and liberation critics have successfully incorporated their readings of the Sacred Texts into Christian faith and practice attests, to some extent, the validity of their approach. The broader discipline of Biblical Studies has benefited enormously from the postcolonial and liberation perspectives, which have highlighted the political nature of the Exodus narrative and successfully challenged the colonial interpretation of the texts, which in some cases supported oppressing communities. Further, the postcolonial and liberation hermeneutic has assisted the inculturation of Christian faith and theology, allowing Christian communities, particularly in Latin America and South Africa, to develop their own forms of Christianity and interpret their history in light of revelation.[2]

---

[1] Walzer M, Said EW. op cit.

[2] Pobee J. ‘Sources of African Theology’ In: Parratt J (ed). A Reader in African Christian Theology. (London: SPCK, 1997): p23-29.

Tienou T. ‘Authentic African Christianity’. In: Parratt J (ed). A Reader in African Christian Theology. (London: SPCK, 1997): p91-98.

 

Rethinking a Postcolonial Critical view of Exodus §4

The historicity of the Biblical account of the settlement has been extensively challenged and some have sought to argue that there was a “peaceful infiltration” of the land, rather than a violent conflict as narrated in Joshua.[1] In this model, the Biblical account of the conquest is interpreted as being inwardly focussed,  delineating the boundaries between the Israelites and the gentiles, thus forging a new national identity – challenging insiders who pose a threat to the group identity, rather than advocating active violence against outsiders.[2] Nevertheless, it cannot be avoided that the canonical form of the text explicitly incites violence against the “other” nations and peoples, claiming the occupation of the land to be a divine grant. The same claim of divine grant was made to justify the invasion of Latin America by Spanish and Portuguese forces following the division of the non-Christian world between the Iberian empires, made by the Pope in God’s name.[3] If the Exodus narrative can be applied analogically to the modern world, an alarming consequence is the possibility that some individuals may claim the analogical application of the conquest narrative to support violent struggle, and even colonialism itself. Thankfully, very few would support such a notion, but this does demonstrate that the Exodus narrative is at best selectively applicable in an analogical sense to the modern world.

The fact that the Canaanites are apparently deprived of justice is complicated by historical reconstructions that suggest the people of Israel emerged from the Canaanites and maintained many elements of Canaanite culture. The vast majority of Biblical scholars have sought to affirm or augment the Biblical presentation of the Canaanites as a highly immoral,[4] weak[5] and idolatrous nation,[6] despite historical evidence attesting the persistence of polytheistic Canaanite religious practices within Ancient Israel.[7] Postcolonial and liberation perspectives have emphasised the political realities of the Exodus narrative and would presumably therefore accept a political (pro-Israel) bias in the Exodus narrative’s portrayal of the Canaanites, who have potentially been unfairly represented and deprived of justice by the original conquest of the land, the writer or redactor of the Exodus narrative, and by subsequent Biblical Scholarship.

This realisation has led a number of scholars to present a Canaanite reading of the Exodus narrative, seeking to interpret the text from the position of others they regard as being victims of oppression within the narrative.[8] For these scholars, the oppression of the Canaanites and their expulsion from the land they occupied is not an appendix to the Exodus narrative, but its culmination and conclusion, intrinsic to Israel’s national formation and identity.[9]

Other scholars have sought to challenge the reading of the Exodus narrative that regards liberation as the dominant theme. For Lyle Eslinger, the central tenants of the Exodus narrative are the omnipotence of YHWH, and the election of Israel.[10] Indeed it is hard to minimise the centrality of divine election in the story and self-understanding of Ancient Israel. God’s favour to the Israelites is understood as being made manifest in the Exodus and the Sinaiatic covenant.[11] The revelation of the divine name to Moses[12] emphasises the uniqueness of God’s relationship with the Mosaic people, and it is this relationship – God’s love for Israel – that led to the Exodus, as Hosea writes: “When Israel was a youth I loved him, and out of Egypt I called my son.”[13] In this view, it is not the sufferings themselves that prompt God to bring Israel out of Egypt, but the fact that they are the sufferings of Israel – the scriptural texts give no indication that Pharaoh’s slaves would have been subject to God’s liberation if they were not of the chosen people.

---

[1] Gnuse RK. No Other Gods. (Leicester: Continuum Group Press, 1997): p7.

[2] e.g. in: Rowlet LL. Joshua and the Rhetoric of Violence. (Leicester: Continuum Group, 1996): p121ff.

[3] Mignolo W. The Idea of Latin America. (Edinburgh: Blackwell, 2005): p.xiv.

[4] Barackman FH. Practical Christian Theology. (Berlin: Kregel, 2001): p97.

[5] Wright GE. ‘The Deuteronomic History of Israel in Her Land.’ In: Wright GE, Fuller RH. The Book of the Acts of God. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1957): p108.

[6] Bromiley GW. International Standard Bible Encyclopedia. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994): p334.

[7] Smith M, Miller PD. op cit.  p195.

[8] Sixteen C. ‘A Biblical paradigm for Native liberation’. In: Weaver J. Other Words. (Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press, 2001): p242.

[9] Walzer M, Said EW. An Exchange: ‘Exodus and Revolution’. Grand Street. 5.4 (1986): 246-259.

[10] Eslinger L. Freedom or Knowledge? Perspective and purpose in the Exodus Narrative. (Exodus 1-15). Journal for the Study of the Old Testament. 16.52 (1991): 43-60.

[11] Nicholson EW. The Decalogue as the direct address of God. Vetus Testamentum. 27.4 (1977): 422-433.

[12] Exodus 6:3.

[13] Hosea 11:1.